Short-Term Investment and the Informational Efficiency of the Market Xavier Vives Institut d'Analisi Econ6mica (CSIC)
A dynamic finite-horizon market for a risky asset with a continuum of risk-averse heterogeneously informed investors and a risk-neutral competitive market-making sector is examined. The article analyzes the effect of investors' horizons on the information content of prices. It is shown that short horizons enhance or reduce accumulated price informativeness depending on the temporal pattern of private information arrivaL With concentrated arrival of information, short horizons reduce final price informativeness; with diffuse arrival of information, short horizons enhance it. In the process a closed-form solution to the dynamic equilibrium with long-term investors is derived.
In this article I study dynamic trading in a world where privately informed speculators are risk averse and have short horizons, and where the market is informationally (semi-strong) efficient due to the presence of a competitive risk-neutral market-making sector. The views that emerge from this work contrast with the classical market efficiency hypothesis, which considers volatility the result of information being incorporated into prices. Still, there appears to be a widespread, although certainly not universal, belief in the (at least) semi-strong informational efficiency of financial markets. The present article derives the consequences for the informational quality of prices of short investment horizons in a market which is semi-strong efficient. What are the effects of rational speculators' short horizons and risk aversion in an informationally efficient market? How will the degree of information incorporated in prices, volatility, and departures from fundamental values be affected?
The information content of prices has been much studied in financial markets. Most of the work has considered static models.3 Dynamic models with asymmetric information have proved difficult to analyze in the presence of risk aversion. In fact, leading papers addressing dynamic trading [such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ], as well as recent work,4 assume risk-neutral agents or myopic agents. A basic technical difficulty in characterizing equilibria is the simultaFor elaborations of the two latter reasons see, respectively, Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990) .
The equilibria of both models are characterized in the article. The following results hold for every temporal pattern of precisions of private signals. Long-term agents want to trade more intensely in any given period the more risk tolerant they are and the more precise the period signal. Short-term traders are less responsive to information, in terms of desired positions, because at any period they have information about the fundamental value v but care about the next period's price (since this is their return to holding the asset), which is only a garbled signal of v. For short-term traders, the more precise prices are in the estimation of the fundamental value the more responsive will be their desired positions to information. Generations closer to the end of the horizon and the realization of the fundamental value want to hold larger positions (in terms of trading intensity), since prices are closer to the fundamental value and also since, potentially, they have more precise private information. The net trading intensity of informed agents (at any period n, the difference between the trading intensity of generation n and generation n -1) is therefore always positive. For the last generation, which faces the prospect of the liquidation of the asset, the desired trading intensity is the same in both the short-term and the long-term cases. This means that in both cases the aggregate net trading intensity across periods is equal. The shortterm and the long-term cases do differ in the temporal distribution of net trading intensities.
The temporal pattern of the precision of private signals nevertheless has important consequences for the effect of short horizons on price informativeness. In this article I consider two leading examples. In the first, there is concentrated information arrival and private signals are received only at the beginning (that is, the precision of subsequent private signals is zero). In the second, there is a constant flow of information and the precision of private signals received by agents is the same every period. In the first case, short horizons impair the informativeness of the price in period N; in the second case, they enhance it. The conclusion, therefore, is that whether short horizons increase or decrease the informational content of prices depends on the pattern of private information arrival. Why is this the case?
The central idea is that the precision incorporated in prices is a convex function of the net trading intensities (indeed, it is a linear function of the sum of the squares of net trading intensities) and therefore works like an inequality index, taking minimum values for uniform distributions of trading intensities and growing with the concentration of net trading intensities in certain periods. The maximum value is attained by concentrating all the trading intensity in one period, while the minimum spreads it equally among all the periods. With concentrated information arrival, long-term traders also concentrate their trading in the first period (when they receive information), while short-term traders spread it over all the periods. The result is a higher price precision for the long-term case. With a constant flow of information, long-term traders spread their net trading intensity equally among the periods (since they receive a new private signal of equal precision every period) while short-term speculators' net trading intensities are not equally distributed (since their trading intensities depend on the evolution of price precisions, which change over time). The result is a lower price precision in the long-term case. Therefore, concentrated patterns of information arrival before the event date will tend to favor superior final price informativeness with long-term traders, while diffuse patterns of information arrival will favor superior final price informativeness with short-term traders. In the first case (concentrated information arrival) price precision is larger with long-term traders for any period, while in the second (diffuse information arrival) price precision is larger with short-term traders only for periods close to the end of the horizon.
The case of once-and-for-all information arrival is also of interest because it replicates the static rational expectations benchmark with far-sighted agents. Indeed, at the unique (linear) equilibrium of the long-term model the optimal strategy of informed agents is to trade the risky asset in the first period and hold the position until the realization of its liquidation value according to the static rational expectations intensity of trade. Informed speculators trade only in the first period and noise trading is absorbed by the competitive market-making sector at stable prices in subsequent trading periods.5 With long-term agents prices respond immediately to the arrival of information and are stable thereafter given the presence of the competitive marketmaking sector. Risk-averse informed agents do not have incentives to trade after the first period since no new information is forthcoming. Static rational expectations models are usually thought of as appropriate reduced forms of a dynamic process by which information is incorporated and revealed by prices. According to the analysis in the article, this reasoning can be substantiated provided there is a competitive risk-neutral market-making sector and informed agents have a long horizon. Then informed agents use a buy and bold strategy with a trading intensity equal to the static case of the typical large-market noisy rational expectations model, like Hellwig (1980) or Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) for example. Nevertheless, if informed specu-lators have short horizons the static rational expectations benchmark will overestimate the degree of price informativeness.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 1 the static rational expectations benchmark model is presented. Section 2 presents price dynamics with a risk-neutral competitive market-making sector. Equilibria with short horizons are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 considers long-term speculators, and Section 5 compares the informational efficiency consequences of short versus long horizons. Concluding remarks follow.
The Static Rational Expectations Benchmark
This section presents a version of the standard large-market noisy rational expectations model, as studied by Hellwig (1980) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , and Admati (1985) , for example, with the addition of a competitive risk-neutral sector of market makers.
A single risky asset, with random fundamental value v, and a riskless asset (with unitary return) are traded in a market with risk-averse informed agents, and noise traders, with the intermediation of riskneutral competitive market makers.
There is a continuum of informed agents, indexed in the interval [0, 1], who maximize the (CARA) utility of the return from buying xi units of the risky asset at price p: Vr = (v -p)xi. Agent i is endowed with a small piece of information (a private signal s1) about the expost liquidation value v. Utility is given by U(7ri) = -exp{-p7ri}, where p is the (positive) coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion. The initial wealth of informed agents is normalized to zero.
It is well known that in a large market, (competitive) noisy rational expectations equilibria are implementable, allowing agents to use demand schedules as strategies.6 Traders submit demand schedules or generalized limit orders contingent on their information, and when optimizing take into account the (equilibrium) functional relationship of prices with the random variables in the environment. Agent i's strategy is a mapping from his private information to the space of demand functions (correspondences more generally). Let X1(sij, ) be the demand schedule chosen by agent i when he has received signal si. When the price is p the desired position of the agent is then Xi(s1, p).
Noise traders' demand depends on the random variable u1. Competitive risk-neutral market makers observe the noisy limit book sched- Notice that what is informative about v is the intercept z of the limit order schedule L(.). Indeed, the random variable z, the intercept of the limit order schedule, is observationally equivalent to the market price and can be thought of as representing the new information contained in the market price.
The efficient pricing (zero expected profit) condition can be justified with Bertrand competition among risk-neutral market makers who have symmetric information, each one of them observing the limit order book. Alternatively, we could assume that there is a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed market makers who submit limit orders to a central clearing mechanism jointly with informed agents. Prices are set by a Walrasian auctioneer to equate the aggregate excess demand (coming from informed traders, market makers, and noise traders) to zero. In this case, in equilibrium, necessarily E(v I p) = p since otherwise market makers would like to take unbounded positions. This condition, and the associated trades of market makers, can be obtained as the risk-neutral limit of markets with risk-averse uniformed agents. [Indeed, in Theorem 6.1 of Kyle (1989) The depth of the market A-1 is increasing in noise trading (ru)-1 and nonmonotonic in p and re,. In equilibrium, and depending on parameter values, the depth of the market may be increasing in risk tolerance and the precision of information of informed agents.8 The explanation is that these changes increase the trading intensity of informed agents, which tends to decrease market depth, but this may be more than compensated by the induced increase in the precision of prices.9
Total volatility is constant and equal to the ex ante volatility of v as a direct consequence of efficient pricing: p = E(v I p). Ex-ante price volatility Varp = -2-Var(v I p) = (rv)--r-1 is increasing in the precision incorporated in prices T 10 Prices are more volatile if they are more informative. An increase in noise trading reduces directly the precision of prices r (and price volatility) even though the trading intensity of informed agents is not affected. An increase in risk aversion or in the noisiness of private information induces a decrease in r via a decreased trading intensity.
Expected trading volume is indeed increasing with noise trading (Tu)1. In fact, as is usual in this type of model, there is trade because of the presence of noise traders and because informed agents have better information than risk-neutral market makers. Indeed, the expected trade of informed speculators goes to zero as noise trading vanishes, since then the precision incorporated into prices tends to infinity and therefore the information advantage of informed agents disappears. Similarly, when the precision of information of informed agents (i,,) tends to zero so does their trade intensity (and their expected trade). In contrast, when the precision of information of informed agents tends to infinity so does their trade intensity, market depth, and price precision, with the result that the expected trade of informed agents tends to (2/7r)1/2r. 1 Sit-I will show later that in any linear equilibrium the strategy of agent i in period n will depend on sin and on public information (this follows since the private and public are conditionally independent). Informed agent i in period n submits a demand schedule The competitive market-making sector sets Pn conditional on past public information and on Zn, the new information in the aggregate limit order schedule Ln(). Past public information is summarized in the sequence zn-I = {Z1, . .., Zn-1 of informational additions from the limit order books, which is easily seen to be observationally equiv- Let us now consider in turn equilibria with short and long term investment horizons.
Dynamic Trading and Efficient

Short-Term Investment
In this section informed traders will be assumed to maximize the utility of the short-run return. At period t, let zrit = (pt+-Pt)Xit denote the (short-run) profits derived by agent i from buying xit units of the risky asset at price Pt and selling it next period at price Pt+i. At stage t a strategy for agent i is a function that maps his private information sin into a demand schedule Xt(jn, ). Recall that we can think of different interpretations of the short-term investment case formalizing the idea of risk-averse speculators with a short horizon. First of all, agents can be long-lived but myopic, and they do not forget information. Second, a different generation of informed agents comes to market every period, each member of generation t inheriting the private information of a member of generation t -1, taking a position, and liquidating it the next period.
The market solution will be taken to be the Bayesian equilibria of the N-period dynamic game (a sequence of Bayesian equilibria of the one-shot games with the defined short-run payoffs). Attention will be restricted to equilibria in linear strategies. In the case of concentrated information arrival, trading intensities are always less than the static level, a, which is reached in the last period. The trading intensity aN equals the static level a because in the static model the trading intensity does not depend on the precision of prices a = p1- I The result that the trading intensity of speculation an is increasing with n (small at first and catching up close to the liquidation date), even when private signals are only received in the first period, is reminiscent of a result of Dow and Gorton (1993). The authors consider an infinite-horizon model with a stock which yields random dividends in each period. Some agents may receive information in advance about the dividends of a certain period (the event date). Short-term informed traders are risk neutral and face transactions costs. The outcome is that short-term traders, when far away from the event, will not act on their information since short-term trading reduces the profitability of speculation.
It is worth emphasizing that noise trading does affect the intensity of trade via the precision of prices. For example, with N = 2 (and r12 = 0) an increase in noise trading decreases the trading intensity a1 of the first generation in the unique equilibrium. Instead of a camouflage effect [as in Kyle (1985) ], an increase in noise trading increases the noise in the first period return p2 (with respect to v) and the response of first period risk-averse informed speculators is a decreased trading intensity.
Proposition 3.1 characterizes implicitly the equilibrium but does not give a closed-form solution. Simulations conducted for a range of parameter values for the two leading examples yield some insights into the dynamics of the market.14 In both cases a unique equilibrium always has been found and, consistent with Proposition 3.2, an is increasing in n. The pattern that emerges from the simulations in the case -rt = 0 for t = 2, ..., N, is the following: A an is increasing in n (starting from n = 2 since Aa1 = a1), but at first the increase is very small and is noticeable only when close to the end of the horizon N. The conditional volatility of prices is found to be increasing with n, slowly at first and faster when close to the end of the horizon (it may decrease from period N to the liquidation stage N + 1). In the first rounds of trade the precision of prices is almost flat and informed agents only vary their positions slightly from period to period. When closer to the end of the horizon, the net trading intensity of informed agents increases and contiguous generations want to have increasingly different positions in the risky asset, since the precision of prices is increasing.15 Market depth is nonmonotonic in n. It increases first due to the reduced net trading in the second period (in the first period only the first generation trades); it flattens out (at a high level) later since net trading by informed agents is very small and decreases close to the end of the horizon due to increased net informed trading activity.
In the constant flow of information case (-r, = r?, for all t) the emerging patterns are more complex.16 The temporal evolution of trading intensities an is typically concave and then convex and correspondingly the net trading intensities Aan evolve according to a U-shaped form with mild decreases at the beginning and sharp increases close to the end of the horizon. For intermediate values of the parameters (p, ',a 2), the conditional volatility and market depth are nonmonotonic, with a pattern of decreasing-increasing-decreasing or U-shaped for the first, and increasing-decreasing-increasing or inverted U-shaped for the second. Otherwise, that is, for low or high values of the parameters (p, 2, U2), the conditional volatility is decreasing and market depth increasing in n. Notice that market depth It is worth remarking that the existence of a competitive marketmaking sector is crucial for the result. Indeed, according to Brown and Jennings (1989) , in a two-period version of the model without a competitive market-making sector, no general existence results can be proved (equilibrium is guaranteed to exist provided second period prices are fully revealing). Further, in a related model, Grundy and McNichols (1989) show that equilibria in which second-period prices add information about the fundamental value coexist with equilibria in which they are noisy measures of first-period prices.
Short Horizons and Price Informativeness
In this section I compare the degree of information incorporated in prices when informed traders have short and long horizons. In the short-horizon case a new generation of one-period lived informed traders comes to market (and inherits the private information of an agent of the previous generation) every period or, alternatively, traders are myopic. In the long-horizon case informed traders live for the whole span (N periods). In both cases, there is a constant (unit) mass of informed traders every period, and they have the same precision of private information.
Price informativeness in period N is given by (LN 1 r,) ] in both the long-term and the short-term cases. In consequence, TN will be larger or smaller in the short-term versus the long-term case according to the relative temporal distribution of the (positive) net trading intensities, Aat. Indeed, TN will be smaller the more equally distributed are the increments A at, the minimum being reached for equal increments every period. In other words, TN can be thought of as an inequality index of the variables Aat (which together add up to aN). The precision TN is larger the more unequally distributed are the increments Aat.17 We will comment also on relative price precisions for n periods before the last (n < N). Consider the two leading examples. First, the case of once-and-forall information reception (that is, T8, = 0 for t = 2, ..., N); second, the case of a constant flow of information (T8, = T81, for all t).
Concentrated Arrival of Information
In this case with long-term agents there is informed trading only in the first period (see Remark 4.3), and equilibrium informativeness of prices T corresponds to the static equilibrium level. Short horizons imply that informed agents will trade in every period. Will this imply that more information ends up being incorporated in prices with shortrun agents who trade on the basis of their private information?
I will show now that, independent of the length of the horizon N, the information revealed by prices with short-term traders will be bounded above away from the static (long-term) case T. This is easy to understand since the long-term case involves the maximum inequality in the temporal distribution of the net-trading intensities: informed trade is concentrated in the first period. since A an) is positive. The accumulated price precision will have to be smaller than the long-term precision. In summary, in order to make prices informative it is better to trade once (as with long-term traders) than to spread net trades over more periods. Let us review the chain of facts which explains the result. First of all, the precision of prices depends on the net trading intensities of informed agents (A a (N) ). Second, short-term traders desire to trade more intensely as n increases (an is increasing in n), but always below the static intensity a, since for larger n the next-period price (the short-run benefit) is closer to the fundamental value v, about which they have information. This means that A a(N) > 0 for all n. Third, in the last period short-term traders desire to trade according to the static trading intensity, aN = a, because trading intensity when facing the liquidation period is independent of the precision incorporated in prices (and therefore it does not matter whether or not there is price information from the past). This means that EN Aa(N) = a. Finally, long-term traders use a buy-and-hold strategy, concentrating their trade in the first period according to the static trading intensity a, because they are risk averse and after the first period no new information (public or private) is forthcoming about v.
In essence, risk-averse short-term traders hold back on trading since they have information about v, but their return is the next-period price, which is a noisy measure of v. Long-term traders, in contrast, can wait until the liquidation period and trade only when they receive information.
By analogy with an inequality index, the more periods there are, and the more even trading intensities with short investment horizons are, the worse is price precision. If the long-term intensity is spread among more trading periods, the accumulated precision of prices (depending on the sum of the squares of the net trading intensities) will tend to diminish. For example, and only for illustrative purposes, if the static trading intensity were to be spread evenly among the N periods then precision ("concentration") attains its lowest possible level, a2/N, and is decreasing in N.
The simulations performed with short-term traders show indeed that the price precision tends to decrease with an increase in the horizon [that is, EN l(Aa (N) )2 is decreasing in N]. Increasing the horizon actually hurts the precision incorporated in prices with shortterm traders.
Increasing the number of trading periods with short-term traders does not help information revelation through prices and, in the context of our model, does not matter with long-term traders. With shortterm traders prices do not converge to the fundamental value as N tends to infinity (indeed, their informativeness is bounded above by the static rational expectations precision). Nevertheless, it is possible to show that in a semi-strong informationally efficient market convergence of prices to the underlying value of the asset as the number of periods N becomes infinite does occur provided trades are notional until the fundamental value v is realized (that is, traders' orders before the realization of v are not executed and can be modified; trade happens according to the outstanding orders when v is realized at some random time). In Vives (1992) an information tdtonnement is considered in which theoretical prices are quoted by a competitive market-making sector with the purpose of revealing the joint infor-mation of informed agents (that is, with a price discovery purpose). The information tatonnement is seen to reveal the fundamental value at "normal" rate of 1/N112. The basic reason is that in the information tatonnement the precision of prices depends on the ( As before, a corollary to Proposition 5.2 is that total volatility, up to period N, in the short-term case is bounded below and away from the long-term case. This reflects that, up to period N, less information has been incorporated into prices with long-run traders. Table 1 expounds some qualitative comparisons of the short-term and the long-term regimes (including both analytical and simulation results as I have pointed out before). In the latter, trading intensities an grow linearly with n, while in the former, first increase in a concave, then in a convex way and are always below the long-term benchmark. The result is that net trading intensities Aan are first below and at the end above the long-term constant net trading intensity. In fact, both solutions are close for low or high values of the parameter vector Figure 1D , before period 4 the dotted line is above the continuous one). This is typically the case, according to the simulations, for reasonable values of the parameters.
Remark 5.2. The fact that (according to the simulations) short-term net trading intensities are first below and then above the constant longterm case, together with the result in Proposition 5.2 that the long-term price precision ends up (for n = N) above the short-term one imply that price precisions with short-term traders are first below and then above that with long-term traders. In fact, for reasonable values of the parameters, it is the case that (as in Figure 1E ) only for the very last periods is the short-term price precision above the long-term one.
It is worth remarking that the departure of price precision of the short-term case from the long-term one can be substantial for plausible parameter ranges. The simulations show that the difference (TN(shortterm) -TN(long-term) ) has an inverted U-shaped dependence on the value of any parameter of (p, a2, or2) (fitting the other two), and that the ratio (TN(short-term) -TN(long-term) )/rN (long-term) is either increasing or has an inverted U-shaped dependence on any parameter of (p, x2, a2) (fixing the other two). The ratio can reach high values for plausible parameter constellations. For example, it is more than 5 for the values (N = 25, a 2 = 1, p = 2.5, a2 = 1.05, cr2 = 1.025). (It is .8 for the example in Figure 1 .)
The analysis of the two leading examples makes clear that in general the result is ambiguous and depends on the temporal pattern of private information reception, with concentrated and constant flow being polar cases. By continuity, and with respect to long-term trading, lumpy patterns of private information arrival (close to the pure concentrated case) will imply short horizons decrease the information content of prices, while diffuse patterns (close to the constant flow case) will imply short horizons increase the information content of prices close to the end of the horizon. The ambiguity arises from the fact that information precision depends on the distribution of net trading intensities, being lower for more evenly distributed intensities. With concentrated information arrival long-term trading provides the most unequal distribution and therefore maximum price informativeness. With a constant flow of information long-term trading provides the most equal distribution and therefore minimum final price informativeness. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that if short-term agents did not have access to the private signals of previous periods then in the short-term case the final trading intensity would be aN = a while in the long-term case it would be aN = Na. The result of Proposition 5.1 holds here a fortiori -the long-term precision is strictly larger than the short-term one: iv + Nrua2 > mv + rua2 > rv + ru E in=1(Aaf))2, since EN=1Aan = a.
A question may arise about the robustness of the results to the introduction of discretionary liquidity traders. For example, in the case of concentrated private information arrival with long-run agents the market is infinitely deep after the first period, and therefore liquidity trading would tend to be concentrated in those periods. Nevertheless, I conjecture that the result for this case (Proposition 5.1) holds. Here is the argument. Suppose that in every period there is some proportion of nondiscretionary liquidity traders which have to trade in the period for exogenous reasons [as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , for example], but that there also exist discretionary liquidity traders who can choose in which period to trade. Then in the long-term case the price will be more informative than in the benchmark case with no discretionary liquidity trading, since the nature of the equilibrium will be unchanged and in the first period only the liquidity agents with exogenous constraints will trade, with the others shifting trade to later periods. Now, with short-term traders, for whatever temporal pattern of liquidity trading, the final precision incorporated in prices must be less than the long-term one since in the long-run case noise trading is at its minimum in the first period.
Concluding Remarks
This article presented a competitive model of asset pricing with private information in a (semi-strong) informationally efficient market. The effect of short investment horizons on the informativeness of prices was addressed. In the process I have characterized in closedform the equilibrium of a dynamic market with risk-averse long-term traders with non-nested information sets. We have seen how short horizons impinge negatively or positively on the information content of of prices depending on the temporal pattern of information arrival (concentrated versus diffuse). A basic fact is that short-term trading does not change the across-periods aggregate net trading intensity of informed speculators. It just spreads the long-term trading intensity among the different trading periods leading to a diminished (increased) final price informativeness when long-term speculators concentrate (spread evenly) their trading with once-and-for-all (diffuse) information reception. We can also compare price precisions with long-term and short-term traders for any period. With concentrated arrival of information price precision is uniformly higher with long-term traders. With a constant flow of information the price precision is higher at the beginning and lower at the end with long-term traders. Obviously, if stock prices guide production decisions19 the information content of prices and the departure of prices from fundamental values has welfare implications: the horizons of traders will matter in terms of welfare losses at the economy level.
Different possible extensions are left for future research. A main question is how robust the results will be to changes in the model presented. We have already indicated a possible extension to incorporate discretionary liquidity traders. Further, the work of Dow and Gorton (1993) in an infinite horizon context suggests that some of the results of the present paper should be robust to stationary versions of the model. Other extensions include the consideration of markets with both short-term and long-term traders, endogenous information acquisition, correlated noise trading, multisecurities markets20, and the effects of public signals. By backwards recursion we obtain Xi, (s1l, pi) = a(sipi) at period 1. The market price is stationary from period 1 on. At periods n = 2, . .., N, noise trading is absorbed by market makers at the period 1 price pi.
Indeed, when setting prices in periods n = 2,..., market makers obtain no information from the limit order book, since zn = un and therefore pn = E(v/zi) = p. Both market makers and noise traders break even in periods n = 2, . .., N, since the market is infinitely deep (Xn = 0). Obviously, noise traders lose money in period 1 when informed agents trade.
